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As You Wear: Cross-dressing and Identity Politics in Jackie Kay’s Trumpet 
By Alice Walker1
Abstract 
This paper explores the theories and practices of cross-dressing through the lens 
of Jackie Kay’s novel, Trumpet (1998). In the course of Trumpet, Kay explores the life of 
a fictional protagonist, ‘Joss Moody’, who was born a woman but lived as a man. With 
close reference to recent critiques of cross-dressing, this paper conducts a detailed 
analysis of identity, gender, and personal autonomy as they are constructed within the 
terms of Kay’s text. Furthermore, it works to illustrate the complex ways in which gender 
and individuality intersect in contemporary cultures, while exposing the logic of gender 
binarism to intense critical scrutiny.  
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You are what you wear. You are what you were. Within the space between these 
two sentences–almost identical, yet utterly different–lies the disputed territory of cross-
dressing. As a practice, cross-dressing destabilises the system of binary oppositions that 
structure Western metaphysical space: the cross-dresser, after all, falls between the 
marker poles of male/female, masculine/feminine, cultural/biological, 
conformist/unconventional. In a society that is obsessed by the question “What are 
you?”–a question that speaks to a deep need to categorise and authenticate individual 
identities–the cross-dresser functions as a disorderly and subversive presence: by 
resisting assimilation within a system of binary oppositions, he or she reveals the 
inadequacy of this system, and, furthermore, questions the extent to which appearance 
and identity are coextensive.  
If we expect to be able to ‘read’ indicators of sex, gender and sexuality, and if we 
expect certain things to appear certain ways, then cross-dressing works by reversing these 
expectations. Given that the practice of cross-dressing can take a variety of different 
forms, it cannot be conceptualised in accordance with any singular logic. As Marjorie 
Garber explains in Vested Interests (1992), ‘to restrict cross-dressing to the context of an 
emerging gay and lesbian identity is to risk ignoring, or setting aside, elements and 
incidents that seem to belong to quite different lexicons of self-definition and political 
and cultural display’ (5). Using Garber’s statement as a point of departure, I would like to 
argue that cross-dressing–or ‘crossing’, as it is otherwise known–is synonymous with 
choosing.2 The process of developing an individual identity is, after all, a dynamic one: 
identity is not, as Garber argues, singular and inflexible, but plural, fluid, and often 
contradictory. Read within this context, Jackie Kay’s Trumpet (1998) offers a valuable 
                                                 
1 Alice Walker is currently studying for a Master’s in Women Studies (part-time) at the University of York. 
She completed her undergraduate studies in English Literature (1999-2002) as a mature student at York and 
worked as a Policy Officer at the Scottish Executive before returning to academia. 
2 Although this essay deals primarily with the issues raised by cross-dressing, I acknowledge the common 
ground that crossing can share with the questions of transgender. I believe that much of the existing 
scholarship on transgender is pertinent to analyses of cross-dressing, but while I do make reference to this 
scholarship, it is not my intention to equate ‘crossing’ identities to transgender identities.   
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illustration of the problematic nature of identity. Through the freedom offered by fiction, 
Kay explores the issue of cross-dressing and, relatedly, the difficulty of gaining insight 
into identities that are not our own. 
 It is my conviction in this article that cross-dressing is a choice; it is a dynamic 
process that is governed by the individual. Without the individual, there is only a pile of 
clothes; the accessories that facilitate, but which do not constitute, the act of cross-
dressing: clothes may make the man, but only when they are worn. To attempt to impose 
a singular significance onto an act of individual choice is undoubtedly glib and 
prescriptive, but it also threatens to ignore the potential complexity and multiplicity of 
that act’s meaning. If cross-dressing exposes the rigidity, and consequent inadequacy, of 
binary modes of thought, then it must also, to some extent, reveal the fluid and 
multifaceted nature of the ‘other’. For Kate Bornstein in Gender Outlaw (2004): 
  
 All the categories of transgender find a common ground in that they 
 break one or more of the rules of gender: what we have in common is  
 that we are gender outlaws, every one of us. To attempt to divide us into 
 rigid categories (You’re a transvestite, and you’re a drag queen, and 
 you’re a she-male, and on and on and on) is like trying to apply the laws of 
 solids to the state of fluids (69). 
 
If, as Bornstein suggests, cross-dressing is an act that relies on socially-defined ‘rules of 
gender’, then to what extent does the cross-dresser, the active individual, require a social 
audience to give meaning to his or her choice to defy these rules? In other words, does 
cross-dressing take place – is it even possible – if no-one sees it? Can it be said to occur 
if there are no witnesses around to interpret it?  Asking these questions is, of course, 
problematic as it requires us to interpret the act of crossing through reference to binary 
logic; we must establish a meaning for the act that is drawn from the limited lexicon of 
male/female, masculine/feminine, gay/straight. In existing criticism, the concept of cross-
dressing has been eclipsed by a host of theoretical models that are predicated on a rigid 
system of binary logic. As such, it has been assimilated into a theoretical discourse that 
claims to valorise ‘otherness’, but which is limited in its explorative scope by its reliance 
on the terms of binarism. How, then, can these discourses expand their parameters to 
account for experiences of gender and identity that are not clearly defined, and which are 
not, moreover, the experiences of the mainstream? Queer theory may claim to address the 
‘other’, but as Stephen Whittle points out, this is itself limited: 
 
It could be argued that because of the gay, lesbian and bisexual history 
 of queer theory itself, it can currently do nothing more than expound and  
 further delineate these boundaries. The crossing of them still belongs to the 
 world of “vogue-ing” and the destruction of them must belong to those for 
 whom they have always been unreal because of their inherent personal 
 incongruity within a gender-specific world (22-23). 
 
As a term, then, and as a choice, cross-dressing can only ever exist within a society that 
dichotomizes and genders particular modes of dress. After all, how can you cross from 
masculine to feminine, or ‘male’ to ‘female’, if such distinctions are not already in place? 
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If society does spot the individual’s (mis)appropriation of gender-specific markers, if he 
or she is able to ‘pass’ convincingly as the gender they perform, then does that not place 
him or her in the same category as the individual who cross-dresses in private, without 
the presence of a social audience to acknowledge and/or interpret the act? If cross-
dressing were to be positioned within the context of an emerging group identity, then it 
would seem to follow that some kind of recognition would be required; to equate it with 
‘an emerging gay and lesbian identity’ would be to equate it a degree of ‘outness’, which 
would by necessity fracture any possibility of ‘passing’.  The question would seem to be 
one of intent. Is the intention of the cross-dresser to signal an affiliation to a gay or 
lesbian identity through recourse to a system of gender-resonant markers, or is it his or 
her intention to inhabit what appears to be a heteronormative gender identity?  
Cross-dressing can, of course, play an important role within gay and lesbian 
culture, but, as Garber argues, it would be foolish to restrict its influence and significance 
to this sphere. To do so would be to deny the role of individual choice: the individual 
may cross-dress to subvert sexual norms and expectations, and he or she might do so as 
part of a gay or lesbian identity, but the cross-dresser might just as easily seek to operate 
as an unquestioned insider within heteronormative society. In a letter to Kate Bornstein, 
David Harrison attempts to draw a valuable distinction between the practice of cross-
dressing and gay and lesbian identity: 
 
 Someone asked me if the transgendered community is like the gay/ 
 lesbian communities. I said no, because the gay/lesbian communities are  
 based on who one relates to, whereas the transgendered experience is 
 different: it’s about identity-relating to oneself. It’s a more inward thing 
(qtd. in Bornstein 67). 
 
To attempt to tether a practice that is as fluid and multifaceted as cross-dressing to a 
particular identity or sexuality is, in Harrison’s view, restrictive and futile. At the level of 
the individual, cross-dressing seems to be more about interrogating expectations and 
signs: it subverts norms by conforming, often in an extreme sense, to the dictates of a 
gendered dress code. As we have seen, cross-dressing is wholly contigent on the logic of 
binarism – it could not exist without the poles of “normal” and ‘other’ to cross between. 
Cross-dressing can be queer and, indeed, queer can find itself in crossing: both exist in 
the space between norms, expectations, and binary oppositions. According to Jean-Ulrick 
Desert in his essay ‘Queer Space’ (1997): 
 
 “Queer” is […] consciously active and aggressive towards its  
detractors. Queer culture would not be queer if there were no other culture 
from which to establish its difference…Queer culture exists because of the 
dominant normative culture. And in many instances the fluidity and blur  
between the cultures are the very richness and contradictions that should be 
embraced (19). 
 
Intention, then, might be what distinguishes cross-dressing from the gay and lesbian use 
of drag. While clothing may have a role to play in signifying a queer identity, it is often 
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used as a way of parodying social norms and values. As Judith Butler contends in Gender 
Trouble (1990), drag and parody are not always what they seem: 
 
 Within feminist theory, such parodic identities have been understood 
 to be either degrading to women, in the case of drag and cross-dressing,  
 or an uncritical appropriation of sex-role stereotyping from within the   
 practice of heterosexuality, especially in the case of butch/femme lesbian 
 identities. But the relationship between the “imitation” and the “original” 
 is, I think, more complicated than that critique generally allows (137). 
 
As I have already indicated, individual cases of cross-dressing differ substantially from 
parodic cross-dressing, as well as from drag: at its most successful, after all, cross-
dressing obscures its own status as an act of imitation, and becomes, rather, an act of 
assimilation. The appropriation of dress codes within the context of butch/femme lesbian 
identity is distinct again, as it is enacted within a female/female context and is not 
motivated by the desire to imitate a male, heterosexual identity. As butch/femme is about 
the proclamation and enactment of a lesbian sexuality – and not about the imitation of a 
heterosexual identity – its objectives are not involved with the idea of ‘passing’. Rather, 
butch/femme is a form of gender-fucking that places a heavy emphasis on the fucking. 
‘Lesbian play with “butch”/“femme”, “active”/“passive”, “s/m” imagery’, Lynne Segal 
argues, might ‘portray lesbian desire and experience through old heterosexual codes’, but 
it also imbues these codes with ‘new meaning’ (219).  
It would seem, then, that the distinction between drag, queer and parodic forms of 
cross-dressing, and instances of cross-dressing in which the aim is to ‘pass’ as the gender 
that one performs, is a crucial one. This distinction describes the space between the 
statements ‘you are what you wear’ and ‘you are what you were’ – the distance, that is, 
between biological sex and the gender identity that one presents. To cross, if the intention 
is passing and not parody, is to offer the following equation: ‘If I am “x” but I present as 
“y”, and you see “y” and don’t allow for “x”, then which is the truth and what do we do 
with it?’ 
 The relationship between gender and ‘truth’ lies at the heart of Kay’s Trumpet. 
The novel tells the story of Joss Moody, an acclaimed jazz musician, diligent husband, 
and adoptive father who has ‘passed’ successfully as a man for the majority of ‘his’3 life. 
With his death, however, and the ensuing intervention of medical, and bureaucratic 
agencies, the “truth” of the situation is revealed: what he is is very different from what he 
wore.  
While Joss is a fictional character, his story is based loosely on the life of Billy 
Tipton, ‘a jazz musician who lived as a man from the time she was nineteen until “he” 
died at age seventy-four and was discovered to be female’. As Diane Wood Middlebrook 
explains in Suits Me: The Double Life of Billy Tipton (1998), Tipton’s ‘death in the 
provincial western city of Spokane, Washington, made news all over the world, not 
because Billy was a well-known musician, but because the scale of the deception and the 
scarcity of explanations endowed the skimpy available facts with the aura of myth’ (xiii). 
                                                 
3 I shall be using male pronoun to refer to Joss Moody as I believe it is the most appropriate and convenient 
method to encapsulate his identity, although I appreciate that it does not necessarily encapsulate the 
complexity of his identity. 
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It is perhaps worth noting here that the language Middlebrook uses in this preface is, for 
the most part, the language of judgement. She refers, in the first instance, to ‘the scale of 
the deception’–a phrase that is suggestive of a criminal fraud or scam. To define Tipton’s 
life as an exercise in ‘deception’ at such an early stage of the narrative seems likely to 
prejudice the reader’s approach to the events the biography describes. Furthermore, when 
followed by a reference to the ‘scarcity’ of available ‘explanations’, the reader is led to 
assume that such explanations are possible and/or welcome; that a transgression has 
occurred and requires judgement. This is not to say, however, that Middlebrook reads 
Tipton’s choice to cross-dress in negative terms: she does not. Rather, what 
Middlebrook’s statements serve to illuminate is how difficult it is to read the lives of 
successful cross-dressers in ways that are not reductive, and which do not posit deception 
or homosexuality as a primary causative.  Middlebrook’s book is, we are told by the 
publisher on the back cover, classified as “Biography/Gay-Lesbian.” I am not entirely 
convinced that Billy Tipton would be happy with that classification. Would he have 
chosen to identify himself or his story as ‘gay’ or ‘lesbian’? Would he have chosen those 
terms, that vocabulary, to describe who he was? 
 In Trumpet Kay transplants Tipton’s story to Britain, and recasts its protagonist as 
Joss Moody, a black Scottish trumpet player. By producing a fictionalised account of a 
life cross-dressed, Kay does not have to adhere to any particular version of the truth. 
Rather, she is free to create a narrative in which the issues that are raised by cross-
dressing can be productively re-examined.  In order to reflect the transient and fluid 
nature of cross-dressing, Kay makes use of a variety of literary strategies. Most 
strikingly, perhaps, she develops a multiple, intertwining narrative structure through 
which various narrators, at various degrees of removal from Joss, present various 
accounts of themselves and, of course, of Joss. This pluralisation of perspective allows 
the reader, the ultimate outsider, to establish a strong, multifaceted impression of the 
central character–an impression which is simultaneously intimate and removed. We can 
know only what we are told by the various narrators, and must fill in the ensuing gaps 
with our own beliefs and assumptions.  
For the most part, Trumpet is a novel in which the reader is encouraged to read 
against the grain of mainstream social judgements, and singular or authoritative accounts 
of ‘truth’. In the absence of Joss, the reader is left with three basic strands of narration: 
that of his widow Millie; that of his adopted son, Colman; and that of Sophie Stones, a 
tabloid journalist who wants to ghost-write a book about Joss. As well as these principal 
characters, various secondary figures, including the doctor who examined Joss’s body, 
and the registrar who ‘married’ Joss and Millie, are given the opportunity to explain their 
involvement with the absent protagonist. If, however, we are seeking to interpret Joss’s 
cross-dressing as the signal of an ‘emerging gay [or] lesbian identity’, then it is to 
Millie’s narrative that we must turn our attentions. Millie is the only character in the 
novel who knew Joss as a cross-dresser throughout his life. Although her voice cannot 
substitute for his, she provides a valuable insight into Joss’s existence as a cross-dresser 
and into her own relationship with him–a relationship that was, apparently, founded on 
truth, support, and personal autonomy. While the other narrators are able to offer 
alternative interpretations of Joss’s cross-dressing, they can only do so after the fact of 
his death. 
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 Broadly speaking, Trumpet traces a series of events that are sparked by Joss’s 
death and the subsequent revelation of his biological identity. The first narrator that the 
reader encounters is Millie, who, as Joss’s widow, is hiding from the press and worrying 
that her son will never speak to her again. Her words are sharp with shock and fear and 
grief. What has she done to warrant such public approbation? The first hint comes in the 
opening pages of the novel, when Millie is discussing her son’s refusal to converse with 
the press: ‘He told me he was too ashamed to go out. I never imagined that people could 
make such a fuss. I now know why they call reporters hounds. I feel hounded, hunted. 
Pity the fox’ (5). While the reader has been told that Joss and Millie were a ‘normal’ 
husband and wife, father and mother to Colman, it is clear that this veil of normality has 
masked a secret scandal. Millie has already, however, foreclosed certain lines of enquiry: 
‘I haven’t killed anyone. I haven’t done anything wrong’ (1). If Millie has not ‘done 
anything wrong’, then the reader can only assume that it is Joss who is guilty of some 
profound transgression. This gives rise to a host of questions: What crime did he commit? 
Why? When are we going to find out what happened? The big surprise (which is not a 
surprise at all if you have read the reviews on the back cover) is revealed sixteen pages 
later, as Millie reminisces about the early days of her relationship with Joss. She is 
young, in love, and worried: Why won’t the man she is courting take her to bed? What is 
wrong with her, or him, or them? It is not long before she demands to know the truth: 
‘“An explanation, you owe me an explanation. What’s the matter with you? Are you 
sick? Have you killed somebody?”’(20). The revelation of the ‘truth’, as far as such a 
thing exists, is cast into the terms of an intimate sexual encounter; this, in fact, is the only 
context in which a full recognition of the space between ‘what you wear’ and ‘what you 
were’ can take place. 
 
He is undoing the buttons of his shirt . . . I’m excited watching this 
man undress for me . . . Underneath his vest are lots of bandages wrapped  
around his chest . . . ‘Did you have an accident? I don’t care about 
superficial things like that.’ I go towards him to embrace him. ‘I’m not 
finished,’ he says. He keeps unwrapping endless bandages. I am still  
holding out my hands when the first of his breasts reveals itself to me. 
Small, firm (21). 
 
On that revelation the flashback ends. We are not told what the emergence of this breast 
will mean to the relationship, and nor do we get to meet the second one. Rather, the 
narrative returns to the present. In the next remembered incident, Joss and Millie are 
getting married. This is not a blessing ceremony or a lesbian marriage, and nor is it a 
parody or an imitation: it is the marriage of Millie and Joss, the bride and groom. The 
reader is not privy to the conversations that have taken place in order to make this 
marriage possible, but it is clearly the result of a series of choices that have been taken by 
Joss and Millie. At some point, they have made the decision to accept a particular version 
of reality, to acknowledge the territory of crossing and all that goes with it: ‘For a split 
second, I feel jealous, imagining what it would be like if Joss were ever unfaithful to me. 
Then I remember and feel safe. We have our love and we have our secret’ (29). 
Throughout the novel, Millie does not stray from this unquestioningly normative reading 
of her relationship with Joss. This is not to say that the ‘secret’ is never acknowledged–at 
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times the practicalities of life make it impossible to ignore– but simply that Millie does 
not recognise her relationship with Joss as being subversive or deviant.  
When the couple decide they want a child, the ‘truth’ of Joss’s biological identity 
is acknowledged, but only tacitly. Interestingly, both partners choose to attribute Joss’s 
inability to impregnate Millie to an absence of sperm, rather than to the presence of a 
womb: 
 
  “We’d say you’ve had a hysterectomy”, Joss says. 
   “No, we’ll say your sperm count is too low!” The look on his face 
    is a picture (40). 
 
There is no suggestion in Millie’s narrative that her relationship with Joss was anything 
other than heterosexual. The accessories of cross-dressing, and the act itself, is not 
eroticsed in any way; references to the actual ‘putting on’ of Joss Moody are scarce and 
purely functional: 
 
 He put on his boxer shorts and I turned away whilst he stuffed 
 them with a pair of socks . . . He was always more comfortable once  
he was dressed. […] His breasts weren’t very big. They flattened easily. Nobody 
except me ever knew he had them. I never touched them except when was 
wrapping the bandages round and around them. That was the closest 
 I came to them, wrapping them up (238-239). 
 
This is not parody. Joss and Millie’s sexual relationship is not based on ‘gender fucking’ 
or lesbianism: they are husband and wife, and what could be straighter than that? The 
relationship is only thrown open to homosexual interpretations after Joss’s death, when 
the people who knew Joss and Millie – particularly Colman and Sophie Stones–are left to 
make sense of Joss’s motives. For Stones, the journalist, homosexuality is a marketable 
commodity in the publishing world: she knows that sex sells: ‘Lesbians who adopted a 
son; one playing mummy, one playing daddy. The big butch frauds’ (170). For the 
relationship between Joss and Millie to be a lesbian relationship, however, would it not 
be necessary for at least one partner to acknowledge it as such? There is no evidence of 
any such acknowledgement in Millie’s account of the relationship, and she should know 
best. The need to define, or impose a meaning upon, private sexual relationships is a 
staple feature of Western cultures. While the temptation to label cross-dressing or 
transgendered relationships as gay or lesbian is understandable, it is also short-sighted 
and restrictive. In Transgender Warriors (1996), Leslie Feinberg uses his own life to 
illustrate the extent to which labels fail to inscribe the nuances and complexities of 
certain types of relationships: 
 
 Some people refer to my love relationship as lesbian, because they  
 consider the fact that my wife and I are female to be a biological 
 determinant of our sexuality. Others, who label me as “looking like a  
 man”, assume we live in a safe heterosexual space. Neither exactly 
corresponds to my life. […] So are my love and I lesbian women, mother and son, 
lesbian woman and gay male friend, or some other combination? Our 
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 relationship is Teflon to which no classification of sexuality sticks (92). 
 
In Trumpet, the fact that Millie and Joss are neither homosexual nor heterosexual (in any 
conventional sense) does not mean that they are not sexual beings. On the contrary, 
Millie’s accounts of her sex life with Joss recur throughout the text, and she is often 
surprisingly graphic in the detail she provides. While stopping short of explaining who 
did what to whom, the sex seems to conform to the stereotypical heterosexual model of 
possession and penetration, of one person being ‘taken’ by the other: 
 
  I know he wants me . . . I feel myself being taken away . . . I feel myself  
  being taken away . . . I feel myself being turned around. He straddles me. 
  Pushes himself into me (197). 
 
This might sound like a straightforward heterosexual encounter but how can we be sure? 
It is possible to read the episode as ‘lesbian’, on the grounds that is a description of two 
women having sex, but why should we? Joss does not revert to being Josephine Miller 
just because he has taken his trousers off. Similarly, his cross-dressing should not be read 
as designating a lesbian identity just because the genitals are consistent with such a 
description. Gender, sex, sexuality, and identity are tricky things to pin down, and what 
one person is doing to another at a particular time in a particular bed would seem to be an 
inexact and disorderly way of discerning who they are.  Rather, in order to interrogate the 
complexities of identity we need to recognise the flexibility of this concept, as well as the 
potentially discontinuous relationship between what one is, what one was, what one 
wears, and what one does. 
 At its most basic level, cross-dressing is an act of personal choice, of dynamic 
self-determination. The self that is being defined, and the perception of that definition, 
can be a thousand different things at any one time and to any number of people. While 
the cross-dresser may have links to gay and lesbian communities, transsexual and 
transgender communities, and heterosexual society, these links should not be used to 
impose a fixed, singular meaning upon the act of cross-dressing.  As Bornstein states, 
‘There are as many truthful experiences of gender as there are people who think they 
have a gender’ (8). All of this would not matter if cross-dressers and transgendered 
individuals did not live in a society that demands absolutes, which constantly asks ‘Are 
you a man or a woman? Are you gay or straight? Are you right or wrong?’ For the most 
part, transgressing gender boundaries gives rise to marginalisation and 
disenfranchisement: if one’s identity is not easily reconcilable to a neat label or a tidy 
compartment, then one’s ability to participate in certain parts of social life is severely 
compromised. Those who fall foul of the gender “rules” tend to end up like the Billy 
Tiptons, the Brandon Teenas4 and the Joss Moodys of this world; vulnerable outsiders 
who run the risk of ridicule, neglect and death, their position too tenuous to be tenable. 
                                                 
4 ‘Brandon Teena, a young white man, moved to a small town in Nebraska in 1993. After a minor brush 
with the law, the police reportedly exposed the fact that Brandon had been born a female. A short time 
later, Brandon was forcibly stripped at a Christmas party in front of a woman he had dated, then he was 
kidnapped, beaten, and gang-raped. […] On New Year’s Day, Brandon and two other people were found 
shot to death; Brandon’s body was repeatedly stabbed’ (Feinberg 1996: 132). His story was later turned 
into the 1999 Oscar-winning film ‘Boys Don’t Cry’, starring Hilary Swank.  
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As Feinberg so starkly illustrates, the implications of transgression can be life 
threatening, cruel and dreadful: 
 
 As my temperature spiked dangerously high, I bundled up and travelled 
 through sleet and snowstorms to clinics and hospital emergency rooms. 
 I experienced raw hatred from some health care professionals who refused 
 to care for me solely because I am a masculine female. I heard doctors and 
 nurses refer to me as a “Martian” or as “It” . . . While delirious with fever 
 I learned once again that my human right to be treated with dignity and 
 respect and caring had to be fought for (168). 
 
It would seem clear, then, that while it is possible to situate cross-dressing within the 
fluid world of queer theory, the material experience of cross-dressing is, more often than 
not, read in accordance with the logic of gender, and sexual, binarism. Indeed, it is the 
widespread social adherence to these binaries that enables cross-dressing to exist in the 
first place, and, moreover, available for critical analysis. Is there a sense, then, in which it 
might be more appropriate to foreground the individual dimensions of cross-dressing as a 
way of accounting for the potential multiplicity of its meanings? We are all what we 
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